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Causal decision theory defines a rational action as the one that tends to cause the 
best outcomes. If we adopt counterfactual or probabilistic theories of causation, 
then we may face problems in overdetermination cases. Do such problems affect 
Causal  decision theory? The aim of this work is to show that  the concept  of 
causation that has been fundamental in all versions of causal decision theory is 
not  the  most  intuitive  one.  Since  overdetermination  poses  problems  for  a 
counterfactual theory of causation, one can think that a version of causal decision 
theory  based  on  counterfactual  dependence  may  also  be  vulnerable  to  such 
scenarios. However, only when an intuitive, not analyzed notion of causation is 
presupposed as a ground for a more plausible version of causal decision theory, 
overdetermination turns problematic. The first interesting consequence of this is 
that there are more reasons to dismiss traditional theories of causation (and to 
accept others). The second is to confirm that traditional causal decision theory is 
not based on our intuitive concept of the causal relation. 
1. Overdetermination and two theories of causation
Overdetermination cases present problems to a diverse range of causal notions. The 
particularity of overdetermination is the fact that there are two or more causes that  
are  sufficient  to  produce  a  single  event.  Some  of  the  classical  examples  of  
symmetric and asymmetric overdetermination are the following (Lewis 1973, 2000; 
Hall 2004).
Symmetric overdetermination
Suzy and Billy are throwing rocks at a bottle. Two stones, one thrown by Suzy and the 
other by Billy, hit the bottle at the same time and it shatters. Anyhow, either of both  
throws would have been enough to shatter the bottle without the other.
The next is the case of asymmetric overdetermination, also called preemption, and its 
difference from symmetric cases lies, normally though not necessarily, on the temporal  
order of the two causes, i.e. Billy and Suzy throwing rocks, and on the interruption of one 
by the other.
Asymmetric overdetermination
Suzy and Billy are throwing rocks at a bottle. One of Suzy’s rocks hits the bottle first,  
breaking it. Billy’s stone would have hit the bottle later, if Suzy’s throw had not broken 
the bottle.
The ways in which Billy’s stone might have hit the bottle can change depending on 
the time at which his throw is prevented to hit the bottle. Thus, there are cases of early and 
late preemption.
Early asymmetric overdetermination
Suzy throws a stone at a bottle, breaking it. Billy was prepared to throw his stone, but he 
did not throw it. He would have thrown his stone, if Suzy had given him a signal, meaning 
that she would not throw. In such case, his throw would have broken the bottle instead.
Late asymmetric overdetermination
Suzy and Billy are throwing rocks at a bottle. One of Suzy’s rocks hits the bottle first,  
breaking it into many glass pieces. Billy’s stone flies a bit later exactly over the spot  
where the bottle was.
It  has  been  argued  that  such  a  distinction  between  early  and  late  asymmetric 
overdetermination is not necessarily a fundamental one (Hall 2004: 236), but I am not going 
to  get  into  that  debate.  There  is  another,  non-temporal  kind  of  asymmetry  implied  in 
overdetermination by trumping (Lewis 2000, Stone 2009).
Trumping asymmetric overdetermination
The officer  and  the  sergeant  simultaneously  shout  at  the  soldiers  to  advance.  The 
soldiers advance, but only following the officer’s order, which seems to be the cause of  
the fact that the soldiers start marching.
Let us now see why these are taken to be problems. A counterfactual theory of causation, 
specially, suffers from this and the above described overdetermination scenarios.
Counterfactual theory of causation
One event is caused by another if and only if the former depends causally on the latter.  
An event e depends causally on a distinct event c, if and only if both events occur and 
if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred.
Now, symmetric overdetermination presents a problem to this theory, because although it 
seems plausible to affirm that Suzy’s throw was a cause of the bottle’s breaking, it is not true 
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that the breaking would not have happened without  Suzy’s throw. The different types of  
asymmetric overdetermination are problematic for similar reasons.
In facing difficulties with overdetermination in general, probabilistic theories of causation 
are not an exception.
Probabilistic theory of causation
An event c causes a distinct event e, if and only if the probability that e occurs, given 
the fact that  c occurs, is higher than the probability that  e occurs, given c’s absence. 
Expressed formally, P(E|C) > P(E|-C).
Suppose a scenario of late asymmetric overdetermination, in which Suzy only throws if 
she sees that Billy is going to throw his rock as well. Suppose also that she always throws 
faster than him. Before the game starts, it would seem to be true that Billy’s throw counts as a  
cause for the breaking of the bottle. For his throw raises the probability of the breaking. But it 
is actually Suzy’s throw that breaks the bottle.  It  is thus a case of probabilistic influence 
without causation.
Symmetric  overdetermination cases  are  also problematic.  Suppose that  both Suzy and 
Billy throw simultaneously and that, somehow, seeing other people throwing stones at the  
same time disconcentrates them. Such distraction lowers the probability of the shattering.  
Suzy’s throws raise the probability of breaking the bottle when Billy is not round throwing 
rocks at the same time. Her throw is a cause of the breaking. But if Billy also throws, the  
probability  that  the  bottle  shatters,  given  her  throw,  will  be  very  low.  Again,  
overdetermination  changes  the  causal  scenario  in  a  considerable  way.  While  asymmetric  
overdetermination  presents  a  case  of  probabity-raising  without  causation,  symmetric 
ovedetermination illustrates causation without probability-raising.
Other accounts of causation, like regularity and dispositionalist theories, are also affected 
by  overdetermination  (see  Lewis  1973,  Maslen  2012  and  Hitchcock  2013).  Given  that 
overdetermination affects somehow a general notion of causation, it might also affect theories  
in which the causal  concept  plays an important  role.  One particular  theory that  has such 
characteristic  is  causal  decision  theory.  In  general,  such  theory  recommends  performing 
actions  that  tend  to  cause  valuable  outcomes.  I  will  now explore  a  case  that  might  be  
problematic to this theory.
2. Decisional Overdetermination
Before getting into some details of causal decision theory, I will describe a decision scenario 
in  which  overdetermination  is  present,  called  decisional  overdetermination.  Here  are  the 
different types:
Decisional symmetric overdetermination
An agent, Suzy, whose only interest is that the bottle in front of her breaks, has two 
options. She can either throw a stone at the bottle (T) or omit the throw (-T). She 
knows that if she throws the stone, Billy’s stone and her stone will break the bottle 
simultaneously. Should she throw the stone at the bottle?
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Decisional asymmetric overdetermination
The agent can either throw or abstain of throwing. Billy’s stone will break the bottle in  
a second instance anyway, if she does not throw. Should she throw?
Two  types  of  decisional  asymmetric  overdetermination  can  also  be  distinguished 
depending on whether the interruption occurs  early or  late.  Decisional trumping scenarios 
may also be considered. Suppose that the officer wants the bottle to be shattered. He can 
either shout at the soldiers to break the bottle, knowing that the sergeant will also shout at the  
same time, or stay silent. The sergeant will shout the order anyway. Should the officer shout  
to the soldiers? I am not going to analyze decisional trumping cases in depth here. I assume 
that, for any account of expected utility, the recommendation in decisional trumping cases  
will  be  the  same  as  in  decisional  symmetric  overdetermination  and  decisional  late 
preemption. The reason for this assumption is not necessarily the simultaneity of the potential 
causes, but, more fundamentally, the causal independence between both, which is implied by 
simultaneity.  Thus,  the  relevant  distinction  will  be  between  decisional  symmetric 
overdetermination and decisional asymmetric overdetermination. However, it might also be 
relevant to distinguish the latter in decisional early and late preemption.
Here is the outcome’s matrix for all cases of decisional overdetermination, which contrast  
the values of the bottle breaking (B) with the values of the bottle remaining unbroken (-B). 
As usual, the rows represent the agent’s possible actions, while the columns represent the  
different outcomes:
B -B
T 1 0
-T 1 0
Before evaluating decisional overdetermination from the point of view of causal decision 
theory, let us see whether the classical version of evidential decision theory recommends the  
rational  thing  to  do.  I  assume  that  every  account  of  rational  decision  is  based  on  the 
maximization  of  some  notion  of  expected  utility.  Thus,  when  defining  some  theory  of 
decision I might leave that unmentioned and only provide the definition of expected utility 
that characterizes it.
Evidential Decision Theory
The most rational option is to perform the action that has the higher expected utility.  
This is defined as the sum of the products of the outcome’s conditional probabilities,  
given that the action is performed, and the values of those outcomes.
EU(A) = Σj P(Oj|A)V(AOj)
We can easily see that in a situation of symmetric decisional overdetermination, the theory 
recommends indifference. On the one side, the expected utility of throwing is near to one, if  
the probability that the bottle breaks, given the agent’s throw, is also extremely high, which 
seems natural.
EU(T) = Σ Pj(Bj|T)V(TBj) = 1
EU(-T) = Σ Pj(Bj|-T)V(-TBj) = 1
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On  the  other  side,  the  expected  utility  of  not  throwing  is  also  near  to  one.  For  the 
probability that the bottle breaks, given that the agent does not throw, is also very high; Billy 
will surely break the bottle with his stone.
In the  case  of  asymmetric  decisional  overdetermination  the  expected utilities  are  also 
equal. The bottle is going to be shattered by Billy anyway and evidential decision theory  
recommends indifference again. It must be noticed that this verdict is the same in cases of  
decisional  early preemption  as  in  cases  of  decisional  late preemption.  The  conditional 
probabilities will be equally high in both cases.
Let us now consider causal decision theory, starting with one of its first and most general  
versions.
Causal Decision Theory
Gibbard and Harper (1978) developed a notion of expected utility based on a solution 
made by Stalnaker (1972), according to which conditional probabilities are no longer  
crucial. Instead, probabilities of conditionals should be considered. The particular sort 
of  conditionals  are  counterfactuals  ( →)◻ .  Thus,  the  expected  utility  of  an  act  is 
defined as the sum of the products of the probability that the different outcomes would 
occur, if the action was performed, with the values of those outcomes:
EU(A) = Σj P(A →◻  Oj)V(AOj)
Other accounts of causal decision theory were developed, prescribing the same results as  
Gibbard and Harper’s version (Skyrms 1980, Lewis 1981). However, I am going to work 
with the one defined above. How does this theory confront decisional overdetermination? In 
the  case  of  symmetric  decisional  overdetermination,  causal  decision  theory  recommends 
indifference as well. Both the expected utility of throwing and of not throwing approximate 
to  one,  because  the  bottle  would  break  anyway,  either  by  the  agent’s  throw or  her  not 
throwing. Billy is throwing the stone at the same time the agent throws hers, which means 
that the bottle will surely break, even if the agent does not throw.  Asymmetric decisional  
overdetermination does not make a difference in the expected values. The bottle would be 
broken by Billy’s stone, if the agent decided not to throw. Thus, the counterfactual holds. 
Again,  as  well  as  in  evidential  decision  theory,  causal  decision  theory  based  on 
counterfactuals  does  not  distinguish  between  early  and  late  preemption.  Indifference  is  
recommended in both cases. Such result is already described by Lewis (1981) with the notion 
of independence hypothesis.
3. Intuitive Causal Decision Theory
It must be questioned whether the same results are obtained in a version of causal decision 
theory based on a simple, unanalyzed concept of causation. Instead of asking whether certain 
outcomes would take place, if a given action was performed, the agent should simply ask  
whether the action he is evaluating will cause the outcomes considered. Ignoring conditional 
probability, fundamental for evidential decision theory, or the probability of a conditional that 
could merely point  out  and perhaps inspire a plausible  theory of causation,  we have the 
option to take our most natural and general notion of the causal relation into account.
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Intuitive Causal Decision Theory
Given an intuitive causal relation, the expected utility of an action is defined as the 
sum of the products of the probabilities that a certain outcome will be caused by that 
action, with these outcome’s values. The following is the formal definition:
EU(A) = Σj P(A causes Oj)V(AOj)
In simple  scenarios,  this  kind of  expected utility  delivers  the  same verdicts  as  causal 
decision theory and, even, as evidential decision theory. For instance, if I want to break a 
bottle  (B)  by smashing it  with a  hammer (H),  the  three kinds of  probabilities  about  the  
breaking given my action will have, at a first moment, equal degrees, that is, P(B|H) = P(H 
→◻  B) = P(H  causes B) and P(B|-H) = P(-H  →◻  B) = P(-H  causes B). It also tends to 
deliver the same verdict as causal  decision theory in Newcomb’s problem, but  I will  not 
discuss this here.
In other situations of simple everyday decision making involving so-called causation by  
omission, intuitive causal decision theory might give the right advice for the wrong reason. 
Should someone water his plant? The expected utility of watering the plant will  be high,  
given the fact that such action will cause the plant to be healthy. The expected utility of not  
watering the plant will be much lower. But why is it so? It depends on whether we support a  
theory that  accounts for negative causation or not.  If negative causation is real,  then one  
might say that to omit watering the plant would probably cause the plant’s death. But if we 
believe that negative events do not cause anything and prefer to describe the plant’s possible 
death as a product of other positive events like, for example, the complex stress produced in 
the roots by a very dry soil, then we would not say that to omit watering the plant will cause 
its  death.  In  this  latter  interpretation,  it  is  not  the  omission itself  but  the  conjunct  of  its  
consequences  that causes the undesirable outcome. That is,  to water the plant will not be 
extremely preferable to omitting the watering. Interestingly, the expected utility of letting the 
plant  without  water  will  be  different  in both cases,  depending on our assumptions about  
negative causation. If we argue that intuitive decision theory recommends watering the plant,  
the argument would lie on the wrong reasons, namely that the omission of watering the plant  
can itself be the cause of its death. I will avoid the debate on negative causation, because I 
think that it is a point where the intuition goes too far (see Beebee 2004 or Dowe 2009).  
However,  negative causation is  going to be crucial  for  an elaborated version of  intuitive  
causal decision theory and will be considered in our further discussion below.
My main interest now is to see whether intuitive causal decision theory gives the right  
advice  in  cases  of  decisional  overdetermination,  and  negative  causation  might  play  an 
important role here. First, in asymmetric decisional overdetermination the probability that the 
agent’s  throw  causes the  breaking  is  near  to  certainty  and  thus,  the  expected  utility  of 
throwing will approach to the value of the fact that the bottle is broken. It must now be asked 
whether it is likely that the agent’s  not throwing can cause the bottle to shatter. Exactly on 
this point and in contrast to evidential and traditional causal decision theory, this version of 
expected utility tends to distinguish between early and late decisional preemption scenarios. 
In the case of early asymmetric overdetermination, the omission of throwing must lead to the 
signal  that  communicates to Billy that  he can throw. Billy’s throw would then cause the 
breaking. But would we say that the absence of the agent’s throw causes the bottle to break? 
Are we committed to say that absences and omissions can cause something? Again, this topic 
6
is not going to be discussed here. Anyway, the signal sending can help to grasp the decision 
scenario  in  such  a  way  that  one  can  avoid  the  debate.  In  a  case  of  decisional  early 
preemption, the agent’s options are throwing a stone or sending a signal to Billy (and not  
throwing). We would not doubt in saying that the agent’s signal causes Billy’s throw and that 
Billy’s throw causes the bottle to break. By the transitivity of causation, the breaking of the 
bottle would be caused in both cases by the agent’s action. Therefore, the expected utility of  
throwing equals the expected utility of not throwing, making it indifferent to Suzy, whether  
she throws or not. This is the same verdict delivered by a traditional counterfactual-based 
causal decision theory.
In cases of decisional late preemption, the probabilities are different. For there is no signal 
that Suzy sends to Billy and his throw does not depend causally on what the agent does. But 
the fact that the bottle is not hit by the agent’s stone could depend causally, according to our  
intuitive notion of causation, on the fact that she does not throw. Obviously, this is only 
plausible under the assumption that omissions and negative events can cause and be caused 
by others.  On the one side,  if  omissions are  considered to  be possible  causes,  then it  is 
possible to think that Suzy’s omission of throwing causes the shattering by letting Billy’s 
rock hit  the bottle.  Thus,  intuitive causal  decision theory recommends indifference in the 
scenario of decisional late preemption. On the other side, if omissions are not taken to have 
causal power or are not considered as possible causal relata, then the theory recommends to  
throw. This seems to be the wrong advice, since the interests of the agent are focused on the  
breaking of the bottle, no matter how or by whom it is broken.
The results at a symmetric decisional overdetermination scenario resemble the results of 
decisional  late  preemption.  In  this  situation,  the  agent  and  Billy  throw  their  stones 
simultaneously and with the same force. It is assumed that both stones are also going to hit 
the bottle at the same time. The probability that the agent’s throw causes the bottle to break 
must be high, although it will not shatter the bottle alone. But what is the probability that her 
omission to throw her rock  causes the bottle to break? Under a very general and natural 
notion of causation, it is a very low one, for we would not say that the agent’s not throwing  
can cause the bottle to break. Her action is completely independent from Billy’s throw, given 
that both events are simultaneous. Thus, the expected utility of not throwing approaches zero 
and, clearly, is much lower than the expected utility of throwing. It seems that causal decision 
theory recommends wrongly again. I am going to clarify later how this unexpected result can 
be rationalized. As was already mentioned, intuitive causal decision theory will recommend 
the same in decisional trumping as in decisional symmetric overdetermination.
There are cases where intuitive causal  decision theory might  give simply an irrational  
advice. Suppose that Suzy is deliberating about throwing the stone at a bottle or not in a 
scenario of decisional asymmetric overdetermination. This time she knows that she has a bad 
run at throwing rocks and it is unlikely that she will hit the bottle if she throws. But she also  
knows that it is very likely that Billy hits it if he throws. Suppose further that Billy will not  
throw if she does. Since it is less probable that the omission of the throw causes Billy’s rock 
to break the bottle, the expected utility of omitting the throw will be lower than the expected 
utility of throwing.
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EU(T) = P(T causes B)V(TB)
EU(-T) = P(-T causes B)V(-TB)
EU (T) > EU(-T)
However, if we take the definition of expected utility used by evidential decision theory, 
the inequality favors not throwing:
EU(T) = P(T|B)V(TB)
EU(-T) = P(-T|B)V(-TB)
EU (T) < EU(-T)
The probability that the bottle breaks given the agent’s throw is lower than without her 
throw, because Billy, who is in a good run, will almost surely break it. This result should be 
the same in the framework of traditional causal decision theory. Thus, evidential decision 
theory and traditional causal decision theory recommend omitting the throw and letting Billy 
break the bottle, while intuitive causal decision theory recommends, maybe irrationally, to 
throw.
Let  me go  back and take  an overview of  our  results.  The  following table  shows the 
different results that the theories considered until now give in decisional overdetermination 
scenarios:
Symmetric 
overdetermination 
Asymmetric 
overdetermination
    Early               -              Late
EVT indifference   Indifference         -       indifference
CDT indifference  indifference         -       indifference
ICDT throw  indifference         -        throw (-NC)
Recapitulating and describing the table, we can say that decisional overdetermination 
cases do not present differences between traditional accounts of evidential (EDT) and causal  
decision  theory (CDT).  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  clear  difference between intuitive  causal  
decision  theory  (ICDT)  and the other  two mentioned theories,  especially  in  scenarios  of  
decisional symmetric overdetermination.  Another distinction occurs in cases of decisional  
asymmetric overdetermination. While both evidential and traditional causal decision theories 
do not recommend differently in cases of early and late preemption, intuitive causal decision  
theory  distinguishes  those  variations.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  the  two  traditional  theories 
prescribe indifference, no matter whether it is a scenario of early or late preemption. On the  
other hand, intuitive causal decision theory prescribes indifference only in decisional early 
preemption,  recommending  throwing  in  cases  that  involve  late  asymmetric 
overdetermination, if negative causation (NC) is not assumed literally.
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4. Contrastive Causation
It is not hard to find other theories that might be compatible in some cases with the results  
given by traditional accounts. Take, for instance, a definition of expected utility based on a 
contrastive notion of causation (see Hitchcock 1996, Schaffer 2005, Northcott 2008), where 
EU(A) = Σj P(A rather than C causes Oj) and C, a set of possible causes of the considered 
outcome  different  from  the  agent’s  action  and  its  effects.  For  every  action  A,  the 
consequences of its omission, i.e. of -A, are included in C. One can argue on whether the 
contrast  class must  be built  around both the cause and the effect  (Schaffer  2005) or just  
around the cause (Hitchcock 1996). For purposes of rational decision, only the side of the 
cause, i.e. of the action, is contrastive explicitly. The contrast class of the effect is already  
given by the outcomes’ partition used in the definition of expected utility.
How do we interpret the contrast between different possible causes? The fact that,  for  
instance, a hurricane rather than an earthquake caused the house to collapse simply means 
that the hurricane caused the collapse and the earthquake did not.  Now, the fact  that  the 
earthquake did not cause the collapse either means that an earthquake occurred that was not 
strong enough (nor sufficient in any other sense) to cause the collapse or that there wasn’t any 
earthquake at  all.  The specificity of the contrast  class may be determined by the agent’s 
interests.
The recommendation under such account will be, at least at decisional early preemption 
scenarios, the same as in traditional causal decision theory. For it seems to be very likely that  
the agent’s throw rather than Billy’s throw causes the bottle shattering. On the other hand, it  
is highly probable that her omission of throwing and the sending of the signal rather than 
throwing  cause  the  breaking.  Indifference  is,  thus,  recommended.  In  decisional  late  
preemption, this definition of expected utility may recommend to throw, depending on our  
assumptions about the intuitive concept of the causal relation.
At decisional symmetric overdetermination, it seems implausible to think that the agent’s 
throw rather than Billy’s throw can break the bottle, assuming that Billy will throw anyway.  
It is also very unlikely that the agent’s omission of the throw and its consequences rather than  
throwing  can  cause  the  breaking  of  the  bottle.  That  is,  the  theory  would  recommend 
indifference. But this is so because both options have very low expected values, which is a 
very different reason than the one that takes traditional accounts to the same results. This is  
the same result of a decision theory based on possible causation, discussed below. I am not  
going to discuss further details about how an approach of contrastive causal decision theory 
could be elaborated, and I will assume that the recommendations such a theory would give  
depend on parameters that are either crucial for traditional accounts of rational decision (e.g.  
the definition of the contrast class) or for intuitive causal decision theory (e.g. the definition 
of the causal relation).
5. Does intuitive causal decision theory get the right notion of causation?
As we have seen, a traditional version of causal decision theory is not actually based on  
causation,  but  on  the  counterfactual  relation  between  options  and  possible  outcomes. 
Hitchcock (2013) examines the vulnerability of traditional causal decision theory confronting 
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overdetermination scenarios, concluding, as it was shown above, that such cases are far from 
being problematic.
Instead  of  simply  saying  that  causal  decision  theory  should  not  be  considered  as  an 
account based on the notion of causation, Hitchcock’s diagnosis is that the notion on which 
the theory is based is just a different one. A traditional account of causal decision theory is 
not based on a concept of actual causation supported by the counterfactual analysis. Instead, 
it uses the notion of the causal relation implied by the counterfactual conditional A →◻  O, 
called  causal  dependence.  The  main  difference  that  Hitchcock  presents  between  actual 
causation and causal dependence is the fact that the former is a retrospective notion, while the 
latter  is  a  prospective one.  That  is,  when one evaluates  whether  c causes  e using actual 
causation, one refers to past events. Both events  c and  e already occurred and if  c had not 
occurred, e would not have occurred. But when we evaluate whether c causes e using causal 
dependence, we think of future counterfactual events. Both events c and e have not occurred 
yet and if c occurred, then e would occur.
I  think  that  Hitchcock’s  distinction  makes  the  case  more  understandable.  But 
understandability does neither imply accuracy nor relevance. After all, every agent should 
assume that the actions he is deliberating about have not occurred yet. Otherwise he would  
just be wasting his time giving very extreme probabilities to the different possible outcomes.  
Another  reason  to  rethink  the  relevance  of  the  distinction  between  retrospective  and 
prospective causation is to ask whether temporal precedence is a necessary assumption for  
the causal analysis or whether the notion of time must be included at all as a condition in the  
definition  of  the  causal  relation.  The  distinction  between  actual  causation  and  causal 
dependence assumes temporal order, but I think that one of the virtues of the counterfactual  
analysis of causation is the way it handles with temporal asymmetry without presupposing it.  
If the conditional -C  →◻  -E is true, the conditional -E  →◻  -C might be false. The non-
backtracking feature of these counterfactuals clarifies the precedence of the cause without 
postulating it. Why should we do this when we face decisional overdetermination scenarios,  
if these look harmless to our traditional account of causal decision theory?
Somehow,  decisional  overdetermination  demands  something  from  the  theory.  My 
diagnosis  is,  thus,  double.  Either  traditional  causal  decision  theory  is  not  affected  by 
decisional overdetermination, but we should strengthen our notion of causation to explain 
that, which shows that decisional overdetermination has some serious consequences after all,  
or traditional causal decision theory is indeed directly affected by such scenarios. In both 
cases, the causal notion involved in causal decision theory must be reconsidered.
6. Possible causation in expected utility
As I have already shown, while decisional overdetermination seems not to be problematic for 
traditional causal decision theory, it is only problematic for a causal theory of decision based  
on some intuitive concept of causality. I have not said much about that concept, nor is it  
necessary to say much, since it must be a mere product of our most general intuitions. But is 
not the fact that the effect would not have happened without the cause a feature of the causal  
relation that fits our most general understanding of it? That is actually another virtue of the  
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counterfactual account of causation. Let us consider a notion of expected utility construed 
with probabilities of causal facts between actions and outcomes, as well as in our intuitive 
version of causal decision theory, but using the counterfactual analysis of causation. In order 
to do that we cannot just take the probability of the conditional -A  →◻  -O, because the 
counterfactual analysis of causation also presupposes that both events involved in the relation 
already occurred. Thus, we may have to face the following problematic definition, involving 
a would-cause counterfactual:
EU(A) = Σj P[A & Oj →◻  (-A →◻  -Oj)]V(AOj)
The agent must evaluate the probability of the fact that if he had performed some action 
and some outcome occurred, then that outcome would not have occurred without his action. 
The  counterfactual  considered  turns  out  to  be  vacuously  true,  for,  on  the  base  of  the  
importation  principle  (McGee  1985),  the  antecedent  of  the  equivalent  conditional 
(O&A&-A) →◻ -O  is  impossible.  One  should  actually  construct  a  definition  of  expected 
utility based on this latter conditional,  but this is not going to be considered here, as the  
results will be the same. Since the validity of the importation principle can be put in doubt 
under specific assumptions (see Arló-Costa’s work on epistemic conditionals [2001]), I am 
not going to take it here as a strong and uncontroversial assumption.
There are plenty of common cases where expressions of embedded conditionals of the 
form A → ◻ -A → ◻ -B do make sense. I think that one could make perfectly sense of that 
using traditional  possible  world semantics  for  counterfactuals  (either  Stalnaker’s  1968 or 
Lewis’s 1979). The relevant changes that such a semantic should confront in order to make 
sense of embedded counterfactuals are precisions regarding the notion of laws of nature and 
their  violations.  I  am not  going into these details  now (see Dowe 2009).  I  will  assume,  
however, that a counterfactual conditional is true, if and only if in the closest world (or in any 
of the closest worlds) where the antecedent is true, the consequent is also true.
For example, if I had a dry match, then, if it was not dry, it would not light. In the actual 
world, w1, seeing a match box with a single wet match in it, I wonder what would happen if it 
was a dry match. Thinking about the constitution of the closest world (or worlds) where it is a 
dry match, I wonder whether the match would light, if it was not dry. In order to do this, I  
have to speculate, this time from w2, about the closest world in which the (counterpart of or 
the same) match is not dry. The hasty response would be to think that such a world is the  
actual world. But that is not necessarily so. For the physical changes that distinguish the  
actual world from w2 might be simpler than the changes that would take us from w 2 back to 
the actual world. It might be that by drying the match, the surroundings were also dried and 
to consider a world where the match is not dry would imply to change the entire environment.  
In  such  a  case,  the  closest  non-A-world  is  not  the  actual  world.  Hence,  the  iterated 
counterfactual of the form A  →◻  -A  →◻  B cannot be converted to a conditional with a 
contradictory antecedent. The occurrence of A, the fact that the match is dry, is assumed from 
w1, but its negation is not. The occurrence of the fact that the match is not dry, is assumed  
from the perspective of w2. This means that A & -A are not assumed in w1 either. The closest 
world to w2 in which the match is not dry might be different from the actual and since it is  
true that the match won’t light there, the expression with the embedded counterfactual makes 
perfect sense:
(The match in the box is dry) →◻ (The match is not dry) →◻ (The match does not light)
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That  is,  if  the  match  in  the  box  was  not  dry,  it  would  not  light.  Let  us  clarify  the 
evaluation of the expressions involved from the perspective of the corresponding possible 
worlds, assuming, just to make the case clearer, that for every world there is only one closest  
possible world:
w1: -A  The match is not dry.
w2: A      The match is dry.
w3: -A & B The match is not dry and it does not light.
w1: A →◻  -A →◻  B If the match was dry, then if it was not dry, it would not light.
Again, the closest possible world to the actual world, in which A is true, is the possible 
world w2. Nevertheless, in w2, the closest possible world where A is false is not the actual 
world, but w3.  In that possible world, B is also the case. Thus, the iterated counterfactual  
conditional is true in the actual world.
Let us now consider the recommendations for decisional overdetermination by a causal 
decision theory based on  possible causation with embedded counterfactuals supported by a 
would-cause  semantics  (see  Dowe  2009).  In  the  case  of  decisional  symmetric  
overdetermination,  the  expected  utility  of  throwing  is  as  low  as  the  expected  utility  of  
omitting the throw. For, on the one side, given that the agent throws and the bottle shatters, 
the bottle would still have shattered, if she had not thrown. On the other side, given that the  
agent did not throw and the bottle shattered, it would have shattered, if she had thrown. The  
theory  recommends  indifference,  which  fits  to  the  traditional  account  of  causal  decision 
theory, but differs from the intuitive approach. In decisional asymmetric overdetermination  
scenarios, the theory prescribes indifference again. 
The account based on possible causation gives the same recommendations as traditional  
causal decision theory. However, the reasons for this are, as in contrastive causal decision 
theory, extremely different for each theory. According to traditional causal decision theory,  
the  bottle  would break,  no matter  what  the  agent  did,  i.e.  the  probability  that  the  bottle 
shatters is for both options very high. But for a decision theory based on possible causation,  
none of the possible actions would cause the breaking. The bottle might break, when Suzy 
throws, but the throw cannot count as a cause. The bottle would still have shattered, if the 
throw had not occurred.
We have a new reason to think that counterfactuals do not give an intuitive notion of 
causation for a theory of rational decision, neither used for definitions of causal dependence, 
nor for actual causation. As it has been mentioned, this also shows that a general theory of  
causation that pretends to grasp our intuitive concepts of that relation cannot be based only on 
counterfactual dependence.
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7. Ranking theory and decisional ovedetermination
There  is  a  definition  of  expected  utility  that  might,  apparently,  share  some  results  with 
intuitive causal decision theory. I will consider such a definition with the ranking functional 
notion  of  causation  at  its  basis  (Spohn  2006,  2012).  The  ranking  theoretic  approach  of 
causation proposes a clear solution to overdetermination cases that,  instead of postulating 
fine-grained  events  (one  of  the  most  plausible  solutions  to  that  problem),  suggests 
considering a conceptual fine-graining. Put in a very informal way, the variable C is a direct  
cause of variable E, if and only if both C and E occur, C precedes E and C is a reason for E, 
given the obtaining circumstances (Spohn 2012b: 354). Taking a negative ranking function κ 
that measures the degrees of disbelief for propositions, such that κ(A) = 0 expresses that A is  
believed, the belief in C is a reason for E if and only if κ(-E|C) > κ(-E|-C), i.e. if the absence 
of E has a higher degree of disbelief, given C’s occurrence, than given its absence.
Using a positive ranking function β, such that  β(A) = κ(-A), and a two-sided function τ, 
such that τ(A) = β(A) - κ(A), overdetermination cases can be described with clarity. In cases 
of symmetric overdetermination, the belief that the bottle breaks (B), given the fact that both 
Suzy (T1) and Billy (T2) threw their stones, is higher than the belief on the breaking, given 
only one throw. That is, for instance, τ(B|T1 & T2) = 2 > τ(B|T1 & -T2) = 1 = τ(B|-T1 & T2) > 
τ(B|-T1 & -T2) = -1. Clearly, it is highly disbelieved that the bottle breaks, given the fact that 
none of  them throws a  stone.  Cases  of  early asymmetric  overdetermination are  clarified 
simply by appealing to the transitivity of the causal chain going from the actual cause to the  
effect, arguing that although the shattering does not depend counterfactually on Suzy’s throw, 
it depends on some state of the stone before it hits the bottle and after the instant at which 
Suzy would have given the signal to communicate that she was not going to throw. Cases of  
late preemption are more problematic and find hardly an interpretation on this theory (Spohn 
2012: 367).
To avoid getting into the debate about whether asymmetric overdetermination is really a 
problem for causation or not, let us go directly to our topic, namely decision theory, and see 
what  this  framework  can  do  about  the  scenarios  we  are  struggling  with.  I  am going  to  
consider a definition of expected utility based on the positive ranking function:
EU(A) = Σj β(Oj|A)V(AOj)
A theory of decision that takes rational actions as the ones that maximize such notion of  
expected utility into account recommends the usual in decisional early preemption scenarios, 
namely indifference. For the fact that the agent’s rock breaks the bottle does not have to be  
more believed than the fact that Billy’s rock breaks it. Billy will not throw, if the agent does,  
so the degree of belief on the bottle shattering must not be too high. Let us say that β(B|T) = 
β(B|-T) = 1. I am not going to consider decisional late preemption for the already mentioned 
reason.
The scenario of  decisional  symmetric  overdetermination is  more interesting,  since the 
account of expected utility based on ranking functions recommends the same as intuitive 
causal decision theory. For it is more believed that the bottle shatters (S), given the fact that  
both the agent and Billy throw their stones, than just given Billy’s throw (B), i.e. β(S|T & B) 
>  β(S|-T & B). Therefore, the expected utility of throwing (T) is higher than the expected 
utility of omitting the throw. This case is  also an example of one of the most  important  
differences between ranking theory and probabilistic causation, considering that P(S|T & B) = 
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P(S|-T & B) and assuming that both the agent and Billy are well-trained stone-throwers. As  
expected, ranking causal decision theory also recommends throwing in decisional trumping.  
It also delivers the right verdict in the bad run scenario described above, in which intuitive  
causal decision theory fails.
In this way, the ranking account of causation does not only analyze cases of redundant 
causation correctly; it can also ground a notion of expected utility that adjusts to intuitive  
causal decision theory. The fact that a decision theory based on ranking functions is more  
similar to a decision theory based on the intuitive concept of causation than to other accounts  
that give different recommendations in particular scenarios means that the ranking theoretic  
framework of causation fits better our general intuitions about the causal relation.
Other accounts of causation, different from the ranking functional approach, might also 
fulfill  the requirements for intuitive causal  decision theory.  Some of these are the causal  
modeling approach (Pearl  2000;  Spirtes,  Glymour & Sheines 2000),  the  theory of causal 
processes (Salmon 1984, Dowe 2000) and the dispositionalist theory of causation (Harré & 
Madden 1975, Mumford & Anjum 2011). There are not enough reasons to think that these 
accounts of causation exclude each other in a fundamental and relevant way. I will  leave  
aside this time the discussion of such differences and on how these theories may support 
intuitive causal decision theory.
8. Is there irrationality in the intuition?
Now that it has been explained how traditional accounts of decision making do not fit our 
intuitive  notion of  causation and that  intuitive  causal  decision theory (and some specific 
accounts supporting it) might serve as an alternative, it must be put in doubt whether the  
intuitive account is really a practical guide for rational decision. Is it really rational to throw a 
stone at the bottle in a scenario of decisional symmetric overdetermination? Apparently, the 
recommendations given by the traditional accounts are right in saying that it does not matter,  
because Billy will also throw and the bottle will surely get broken, which is the agent’s only 
interest.  The  decisional  overdetermination scenarios  described above do not  consider  the 
energy lost by throwing stones, which would be a reason to twist the agent’s indifference.  
Suzy should not throw in such cases. Anyway, these situations, far from being problematic,  
do not worry us now.
There are two reasons that could explain why the prescriptions given by a theory based on  
an intuitive notion of causation tend to the option of throwing, rather than omitting the throw. 
The first one, which is clearly captured in ranking causal decision theory, is the fact that two  
throws ensure the shattering of the bottle more than just one. Even if we assume that it is very 
likely that nothing will go wrong, a rational agent should not dismiss the mere possibility that  
something  can  go  wrong.  If  just  one  thing  goes  wrong  when  both  Suzy  and  Billy  are 
supposed to throw the stones, the bottle will still break. But if just one thing goes wrong after 
Suzy decides to omit the throw, leaving the responsibility to Billy, the bottle won’t shatter. If 
Suzy does throw, then two things have to fail to expect that the bottle won’t break.
The second reason is the very realistic and practical fact that agents weight their beliefs  
about causal facts according to the confidence they give to the possible causes considered. If 
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a decisional scenario ends up in indifference, the agent might evaluate the potential causes of 
the desired outcome in terms of confidence. To understand the difference between this notion 
and the degree of belief under which an agent evaluates the act’s possible causal relation with 
the  outcomes,  it  is  important  to  notice  that  the  former  only applies  directly  to  the  other 
possible causes,  which are different  from the evaluated action itself.  We can hardly give 
probabilities to actions (Spohn 1977, Levi 1986); we just suppose what they would cause, if 
they were performed. But we can assign probabilities to alternative causes of the relevant 
outcomes. Confidence is expressed by such degrees of belief on the alternative causes and on 
the  impossibility  to  attach  probabilities  to  actions.  Somehow,  in  decisional  symmetric 
overdetermination  scenarios,  any  rational  agent  will  choose  the  actions  that  are  related 
causally to his desired outcomes, in spite the fact that traditional versions of expected utility 
may initially promote indifference. If Billy and I are both great at smashing bottles,  why 
should I  put  more confidence on his  throw than on mine? Of course,  this  self-confident 
attitude must not always be assumed; it should be just considered as a strategic (and thus, 
rational) tie-breaking move in cases of initial indifference.
I have shown that decisional overdetermination is not problematic for traditional causal 
decision theory. Nevertheless, what seems to be threatening by such kind of scenarios is the 
notion of causation on which traditional definitions of expected utility are based. A version of 
expected utility based on an intuitive notion of causation differs from traditional accounts.  
This does not only confirm that the fundamental concepts considered in traditional accounts  
of  expected  utility,  for  example,  counterfactual  dependence,  are  far  from  a  transparent  
definition of causation. It also suggests that a fundamental and general theory of causation  
should be searched with more independence from those concepts. Furthermore, a theory that  
tells us how to act rationally should not only consider the importance of an agent’s causal  
influence on the relevant outcomes, but also be based on a notion of causation that clearly  
explains what is usually understood as a causal  relation and what causation really is.  An 
intuitive approach may be a crucial point in reconsiderations of the foundations of causal  
decision theory, although it should not be the last step.
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